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Abstract 
This paper explores the dynamic evolution of water quality policy in a 
hierarchical country like South Korea since the 1980s. The stage-based in-
stitutional analysis explains the South Korean water policy process as a set 
of incremental change stages. Additionally, the normative approach is used 
to complement the rational institutionalism as it is less capable of address-
ing the motivation and initiation of change. Based on the lenses of shift in 
governance as water reform ideas to Korean case, strong national govern-
ment initiatives on water quality face the intrinsic problems of a centrally 
driven process of water reform. Adopting new policy tools and ideas with-
out building up formal and informal institutions of collaborative govern-
ance has led to the limited and selective operation of innovation for better 
water management.  
Key words: water policy change, institutional approach, governance 
change, collaborative governance 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade we have observed significant developments in en-
vironmental policy in Korea, particularly in terms of innovation, which 
many scholars believe was mainly triggered by a chain of water pollution 
accidents in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (See Koh 1995). However, 
more elaboration is needed to analyse the significant policy changes, in 
particular, since the mid-1990s. Scholars have become aware of dynamic 
interdependence between formal and informal institutions in the water pol-
icy change of South Korea. For example, the roles of policy networks by 
Park (YS 2002), water management paradigm by Park (SJ 2004) are the 
key features of Korean water policy change. In particular, Park (SJ 2004) 
argues that there has been shifted towards IWRM based on the compara-
tive analysis of water policy in the US and South Korea, despite contextual 
challenges and consequential limits. Jeong and Koh (2002) researched the 
first voluntary regulation agreement between government and a commu-
nity group. However, the study of macro policy change with in the recent 
development of innovative institutions is underexplored, and this is where 
this research comes in.  
 
Change itself is not surprising in water management, but the mecha-
nisms of change matter. There have been many calls for the radical reform 
of water management in policy tools as well as the way of management in 
a number of countries since current arrangements are failing to provide es-
sential water services, including water pollution control (Rees 1998; Sep-
pala 2002). Contradictorily, there is little empirical evidence suggesting 
that such radical reforms actually take place.   
 
In this paper, we argue that policy change process is the result of inter-
action among policy entrepreneurs and normative rules such as governance 
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style based on the given but evolving institutional settings. Analysts who 
have adopted an institutional approach suggest that the policy system 
(processes, organisations, laws etc) is rarely designed from one perspective 
but is subject to path dependent change and grounded in socio-political, 
cultural contexts which are themselves subject to only gradual shifts. The 
stage based notions of Saleth and Dinar (2004) provides an excellent ex-
planatory framework for incremental change itself in water institutions 
based on rational choice approach. Nevertheless, the rational choice cannot 
explain why the norms of policy reform have been adopted in certain 
countries when not in others (Mollinga 2001).  
 
Accordingly, the normative approach is adopted as a complementary 
framework in the analysis. In particular, the shift in water governance 
change among water reform ideas is used to examine the incremental water 
quality policy changes in South Korea. This paper raises the following 
questions on water policy reform and changes: To what extent have reac-
tive reform measures in water quality policy evolved in South Korea? 
Which type(s) of governance dominate during gradual innovation and 
why? What have the relationship between policy change and shift in gov-
ernance style brought?  
 
The next section discusses how new institutionalism provides the neces-
sary theoretical and methodological tools for the analysis of policy 
changes. The main part of the paper consists of an exploration of public 
documents for a case analysis. This section, after a brief description of the 
water resource and pollution situation in South Korea, will consider three 
phases of water quality policy evolution. These findings form the basis of 
the argument presented in the conclusion that a modified stage-based insti-
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tutional approach may present a convincing explanation of water quality 
policy change.   
2. Theoretical background: water policy change and 
stability 
2.1 Institutional stability of policy changes 
The significance of water institutions for policy reform has gained more 
attention as Williams (1994: 3) indicates “policy prescriptions, which have 
moved from 'getting the prices right' to 'getting the property rights right', 
now centre on 'getting institutions right'”. This paper depends on the insti-
tutional decomposition and analysis (IDA) framework developed by Saleth 
and Dinar (2004), which is used to recognise changes in the institutional 
structure of water policy, the legal system as well as the institutional envi-
ronment as exogenous influences, and to examine their relationships in the 
water policy evolution process. They argue that it is natural and economi-
cally sensible for institutional change to occur in a gradual way in reality 
as this minimises the transaction costs of reform.  
 
Despite the excellent explanatory power of the IDA framework, it de-
pends on the rational choice analysis, which is not sufficient to understand 
less rational, but politically motivated and/or normative reform processes 
(See Mollinga 2001), which are quite common features of water resource 
management. We argue that the demand for changing the way of managing 
water resource, works as driving force for water reform. In the next sec-
tion, the current water reform ideas and their relationship with institutional 
change will be addressed.  
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2.2 Change or adding-in of water reform ideas 
 
The last two decades have brought substantial shifts in the role of the 
state and emerging notions about informal institutions as well as formal 
state organisations (Carney and Farrington 1998; Pierre 2000). Water re-
source management is not an exception to this trend. It is a classical case 
of government failure that segmented governmental agencies are ineffec-
tive in handling the complex nature of water management (Koh 2002). 
Yet, attempts to ‘marketise’ water resources due to the government failure 
in water management have been evaluated and generally shown to have 
not been as successful as liberal economists’ originally thought. Hence, the 
management problem has been regarded as “the challenges of implementa-
tion and the problems of governmental steering in complicated systems of 
interdependence” (Bressers et al. 1994: 4-5).  
 
In order to response this intricate nature of water reform, various inter-
national conferences and practical experience brought major streams of in-
novation ideas: treating water as economic goods (Winpenny 1994) e.g. 
water pricing reform, integrated water resource management (IWRM) 
(Jønch-Clausen 2004), decentralization (Mody 2004) and collaborative 
water governance1 (Heikkil and Gerlak 2005) from stakeholder participa-
tion to notions of partnerships (Sabatier et al 2005). Apart from rationalis-
ing water investment system such as pricing reform, the way of managing 
water resource is recommended to progress from segmented management 
                                                     
1 The recent reform idea, collaborative water governance, or co-management, 
refers to ‘a group of diverse stakeholders, including resource users and govern-
ment agencies, working together to resolve shared dilemmas’ (Heikkil and Gerlak 
2005: 583). 
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towards more integrated and participatory governance, collaborative water 
governance. With the complex nature of recent water reform, this paper 
proposes that the notion of water governance has motivated a practice of 
continuous innovation.  
 
However, this notion of reform itself is normative ideas in nature; thus, 
it is hard to generalised particular prescriptive approach would work in 
specific contexts. Therefore, it is more plausible that to combine the no-
tions of governance reform ideas with Saleth and Dinar’s IDA framework 
in order to understand policy change process as the interaction among pol-
icy entrepreneurs and normative rules such as water reform ideas within 
institutional settings (See Figure 1). In the next section, after brief descrip-
tion on general water management in South Korea, the water quality policy 
change will be anlalysed based on the combined analytical framework.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Institutional change in water management 
 
 
 
Policy change 
Segmentation Æ Limited coordinationÆ Collaboration
Governance reform drive 
Institutional settings
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3. Analysis  
3.1 Water management in South Korea 
Water conditions and supply for economic growth  
South Korea is located in the south of the Korean peninsula (total area is 
99,912.95 km2) and about seventy per cent of the country is mountainous. 
Korea is in the moderately humid zone on medium latitude, the yearly dis-
tribution of precipitation is concentrated in the summer. During the rainy 
season from June to September, 66 percent of the annual average precipita-
tion of 1,274 millimetres falls, often causing the flooding problems 
through the highly populated valleys2. The total basin area of the ten larg-
est rivers in Korea is 74, 963 square kilometres, constituting 75 percent of 
the national total. The longest river, the Nakdong River basin, accommo-
dates a population of about 12 million, while the largest river basin, the 
Han River basin, has about 17 million habitants. Major population concen-
trations and industrial facilities are located near the downstream areas of 
the major rivers and the great priority for water supply is given to domestic 
and industrial uses (Shim and Lee 1996).  
 
Both major policy instruments in the 1970s (the Integrated River Basin 
Development Plan for four major rivers and Comprehensive Development 
plan for the Han River) were dedicated to enabling economic growth. As 
one of the main roles of government is to supply water, the total capacity 
                                                     
2 South Korea’s population density is 481/km2, one of highest in the world. 
About 89% of the population lives n the urban area(2003). 
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for public water provision in Korea has been improved, as judged by indi-
cators, such as the population with access to piped water supply, which 
shows an increase from 79.0 % (1991) to 89.4% (2003) (OECD 2006). In 
order to overcome the physical limitations of water supply conditions men-
tioned above, and, to support the rapid economic growth since the 1970s3, 
numerous artificial dams and reservoirs have been built and have become 
the main water supply source. Of the overall installed water supply capac-
ity of Korea (33.5 billion tons in 2004), river flow accounts for 42.7% 
(14.3 billion tons), lake and reservoir supplies 46.0% (15.4 billion tons) 
and ground water 11.3% (3.8 billion tons) (PCSD 2005). In terms of water 
usage, agriculture (61%) is the heaviest user, and the amount of industrial 
water use (12%) is least (Op cit.). 
Water pollution: Problem malignancy  
The country remains dependent on its rivers as the primary source of 
drinking water and other usages; there is 90% dependency on the rivers 
(incl. dams (Han 2000). This represents a serious challenge to conven-
tional water resource management given the degradation of water quality. 
For example, Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD hereafter) concentration 
downstream in the Nakdong River at Mulgum, which supplies water to 
more than 4 million people, went up to 5 mg/l/year (Figure 2). In addition, 
eutrophication has been identified as a chronic water quality issue in the 
artificial lakes situated in some river basins, such at Paldang on the Han 
River, Daechong on the Geum River, Juahm on the Youngsan River and 
Mulgum on the Nakdong River where the lower reach is blocked by a dyke 
                                                     
3 Dramatic changes in river environments, such as increasing channelisation of 
riparian areas (4,600km in 1967, 6,412km in 1981 and 17,186km in 1982) and the 
building 14 multi-purpose dams with 12 reservoir dams, have taken place over the 
last three decades (Lee, M.H. 2003). 
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(OPM, 2002). Furthermore, non-point source pollution has become the lat-
est agenda for water quality management since the late 1990s. Though vast 
investment in waste water treatment facilities has been conducted in the 
four major river basins, it appears that conventional water quality policy 
cannot deal with non-point source pollution, for which the portion of the 
pollution load is forecast to increase from 28% in 1998 to 43% in 2020 
(PCSD 2005).  
 
Fig. 2. Changes in the BOD concentrations in the four major rivers (1985-
2004) Source: Adapted from the Korean National Statistical Office, Korean Statis-
tical Information System (kosis.nso.go.kr), the Ministry of Environment 
(www.me.go.kr)  
Water management agencies 
Water resource management and economic-social development in South 
Korea remain in the hands of public bodies in a largely fragmented and 
segmented way, with water quality and quantity under different agencies 
(See Table 1). Such segmentation has been the case since the 1950s, when 
the Republic of Korea was founded. Land use and river management man-
aged by MoCT often contradict the water quality management of MoE, 
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which has been heavily criticised by environmental NGOs (PCSD 2005). 
The details of management structure and challenges along with the evolu-
tion of water quality policy will be analysed in the next section.  
Table 1. Fragmented roles of division in Korean governmental agencies*  
 Policy /plan Main management targets 
MoE Water quality conservation Plan 
Green Vision 
Drinking water and sources 
 
MoCT National Water Resource Plan Rivers & Flood control 
Public surface water and reservoir 
Ground water (quantity) 
MoAF Agricultural and fishery water usage  
MoCIE Rural development plan  
MoGAHAProtection from natural disaster Spa 
* see Reference II: Abbreviations. 
Source: Kim (S.H 2002), Watershed management in Korea, World Watershed Fo-
rum 
3.2 Three stages of water quality policy change 
Before the evolution of water quality policy is analysed, the socio-
political change in South Korea for the last two decades needs to be ex-
plained. In brief, the political landscape of South Korea can be character-
ised by three central aspects: Political democratisation in the late 1980s, 
the growth of civil society led by nationwide NGOs since the 1980s (see 
Armstrong 2002) and the adaptation of the local autonomy system in 1995 
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(Choi and Park 2001), which has given a slight push towards the decen-
tralisation of a traditional, centralised nation-state. In addition, the eco-
nomic crisis of 1997-98 brought new liberal ideas to public service and 
government structures.  
Command-and-control regulation of water quality control measures 
(1989 ~1994) 
After the shocking water pollution in the drinking water and the Nak-
dong River as a main water source in 1988 and 1989, the first ever nation-
wide policy measure for water quality protection, the Comprehensive 
Measure for Clean Water Provision, was announced in September 1989. 
The Environmental Agency, which set up the comprehensive plan, was 
upgraded to the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in 1990, a change which 
heralded the stricter regulation of water pollution and increased investment 
in treatment facilities. MoE expanded its capacity with increased financial 
support and transferred functions from MoCT and the Ministry of Health 
in 1994, although subsequently monitoring and local water service provi-
sion were handed down to local authorities4. An example of this was, when 
the Prime Minister Han Duck-soo announced the creation of the apex 
cross-ministry committee, the Water Policy Coordination Committee 
(WPCC hereafter), under his Office in order to stem the soaring public dis-
trust of government because of the continuous water pollution accidents.  
 
Accordingly, this stage of water quality policy in Korea can be called 
‘the era of water pollution accidents and reactive policy’. Koh (1995) finds 
                                                     
4 The transfer of all enforcement duties in water quality management to local 
authorities was realised in 2002. However, Koh (2002) and OECD (2006: 17) 
point out that local capacity in water management needs to be improved with the 
support of central government.  
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that the key reason for water policy change in the late 1980s up to the early 
1990s was a series of water pollution accidents rather than governmental 
initiatives. She criticises the package of water quality control plans at that 
time as myopic, prescriptive and based on the lack of transformative per-
spectives in central government agencies such as MoE. Given that MoE 
was a young and relatively small agency, it was not strong enough to nego-
tiate and compete against the traditionally strong initiatives of resource de-
velopment launched by MoCT. For example, while MoE set up the water 
quality standard, stricter discharge standards and expanded land use regu-
lation in the water source protection areas, MoCT applied the deregulation 
of zoning policy in 1993, which contradicted the precautionary regulation 
on pollution control in the water source areas.  
 
Despite the limited capacity of water quality management and conven-
tional segmentation problem, Korean water quality policy became dra-
matically progressive during the 1990s, as did the compressed and rapid 
economic growth of the nation over the last three decades. Central gov-
ernment agency-dominated, end-of-pipe regulation and limited devolution 
to local authorities adopted the basin-specific policy in the mid 1990s in 
order to deal with chronic water pollution in the major water sources, the 
four large river basins.  
The place-based management in four major river basins (1995~2005) 
The 2nd stage of water quality policy in Korea started in 1995, when the 
President announced the long-term environmental goals and strategic plan, 
Green Vision 21. Organised by the apex state body, the Comprehensive 
Measure for Water Management (CMWM hereafter), announced in 1995 
and legalised in 1998, adopted a more participatory and river basin-based 
decision making with increased financial support. The measure involves 
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precautionary policy tools such as riparian buffer zones, purchasing pro-
tected land, a total load management scheme of introducing a local pollu-
tion allowance balancing the development impact and increased invest-
ment in water treatment and pipe management (See Table 2).  
Table 2. Key features of CMWM (1996~2005) 
- Reshaping of Watershed Management Organization, River basin-oriented insti-
tutions 
- Total Pollution Load Management System: voluntary in the Han River, com-
pulsory in the three other major rivers 
- Water Use Charges paid by consumers of water provision in the downstream 
areas, Watershed Management Funds   
- Designation of Riparian Buffer Zones   
- Purchase of land near drinking water source 
 
However, the measure was criticised by experts and environmental 
NGOs since the main policy tools centred on water quality issues and 
compensation for the regulation in the upstream regions, which was less 
than the demands for more radical measures, e.g. introducing integrated 
management to address segmentation of water organisations (See Lee et. 
al. 2005). MoE made claims for the policy characterising it as a “newly 
adopted integrated river basin management” based on the public consulta-
tion process before the legislative process such as more than 420 open fo-
rums and public hearings from 1998 to 2002. However, this participatory 
policy making process did not lead to the innovative institutional change 
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needed and the only change of water institutional arrangements was the 
newly organised river basin management committees. Moreover, the frag-
mentation of river management among national agencies and local authori-
ties persists and the coordination within each committee, which on average 
only meets once a year remains rhetorical. Despite the radical application 
of public participation in the policy making process, governance structure 
did not forward more collaborative governance and remains at the limited 
coordination level. 
 
Notably, the beginning of the new century has seen mixed outcomes of 
the water policy reform package that has been introduced since the mid 
1990s: strong legislation in all four major river basins had completed by 
2002 coexists with the continuation of chronic water quality degradation 
problems. For example, the first special measure in the Han River basin 
was to raise water quality to the first degree of water source standard. 
However, the persistent degradation of water quality has meant the Han 
river has remained in the 2nd degree (Lee et al. 2005). In the mean time, 
MoE, by creating the Watershed Policy Division5 in 2003, paved the way 
to reinforce the top-down watershed-based management of CMWM. Even 
though this division published the idea of watershed community and has 
financially supported the voluntary groups at the community and sub-basin 
levels, it is considered as more centralised governance because the official 
institutional arrangements have been stable in the form of rhetorical basin 
committee within fragmented water management.  
 
                                                     
5 The watershed policy division started to gather scattered functions of basin 
management under the priority of drinking water provision, inside MoE, then, it 
drafted the recent long-term plan for Water Environment Management in 2006.  
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Consequently, a new way of public involvement has turned out to be 
marginalised because co-operative water management cannot be planted 
into the hierarchical and largely symbolic operation of newly established 
river basin committees. While these state-led prescriptions muddled 
through opposition from residential groups and interstate partners, new 
forms of cooperative initiatives, government-nongovernmental organisa-
tion partnerships became noticeable over the urban, sub-basin levels in the 
late 1990s, as they had done in Europe and the US since the 1980s. For ex-
ample, the Daepo Stream case is regarded as proof of participatory gov-
ernance in South Korea. It is the first symbolic case of voluntary agree-
ment over water conservation by community group (Jeong and Koh 2002; 
Park SJ 2005). Arguably, this voluntary regulation experience remains an 
isolated success as the second negotiation attempt by MoE over stricter 
regulation in the Paldang Lake has been on-going for more than 5 years 
thus far. Not surprisingly, the contrasting outcomes of recent community 
participation shows that often, the reality is quite different from what it is 
branded by the government agency in charge, as Freeman (1997) points 
out. Therefore, as yet collaborative governance can not really be said to 
have started in South Korea as it has been claimed, moreover, the delay of 
innovative governance is related to the path dependence from the process 
of centralised water policy reform. The new style of collaborative govern-
ance hasn’t been rooted in South Korea yet: water quantity and quality are 
managed separately at the national level, while voluntary water partner-
ships remain islands of new experiments.  
 
2004 and 2005 saw the interesting end of the 2nd stage in the Korean wa-
ter quality policy process. In 2004, the new president, Mr. Roh chose sus-
tainable water management as one of the 100 current national agendas to 
address during his office. Re-structuring water management at the highest 
 16
level of government was the outcome of constant debate among govern-
ment agencies, water experts and NGOs, led by PCSD since its creation in 
20016. The powerful PCSD managed to build up consensus of stakeholder 
groups and put forward the agreed outcome through discussions with co-
ordination committees under the PMO during a period of nearly two years 
research. Another impressive experiment in 2004~2005 was the National 
Water Resource Plan Update, which organised experts and various groups 
of stakeholders at the national, local and community levels. The radical re-
form was recommended by PCSD and conducted by MoCT, which is in 
contrast to the less transformative and centralised CMWM. It was a radical 
social learning process for MoCT to become adaptive in order to address 
uncertainty of water demand and supply forecast through more open con-
sultation and co-management process after the cancellation of the Young-
wol Dam project due to strong environmental concern.  
 
In 2005, PCSD recommended that the President set up the integrated 
water management plan and its respective legislation, the Water Act, to 
solve the segmented water management structure among government 
agencies, in particular, MoE and MoCT. Three scenarios were prepared 
because it was too controversial and uncertain to select one idea7: a water 
coordination committee under PMO - similar to WPCC-, the amalgama-
tion of MoE and the water-related organisations in MoCT and the Water 
Management Committee, a powerful apex committee with planning func-
tion under PMO (PCSD 2005). In the meantime, WPCC was closed down 
in 2005 during the rationalisation of cross-government committees. Al-
                                                     
6 Major works by PCSD involve an ‘Improvement plan of a long-term water 
resource plan (March 2001)’ and ‘Public hearing to improve a sustainable water 
management system (April 2003)’.  
7 One of the authors was a member of the expert group to conduct the research.  
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though this apex committee had been the face of place-based measures in 
the four river basins since 1995, water experts and the media had con-
stantly been suspicious of WPCC and the sub-working group had not been 
capable of co-ordinating the conflicting interests of governmental agen-
cies, in particular, since WPCC failed to solve the conflicts between the 
development and conservation of the Saemangeum sea marsh in 2001 
(Hankook Ilbo, 20/10/2005). Finally, the President and cabinet members 
decided to set up the Water Management Committee and to enact the Wa-
ter Act with a co-operative draft proposal of MoE and MoCT in October 
2005. The most recent stage of water quality policy has moved on to stage 
3 after the President’s active intervention in 2005.  
Water Bill Legislation and Eco-conservation (2006 ~): progress or 
regression?  
The most recent stage of Korean water quality policy has just started 
and is clearly on on-going process. The reason the authors regard 2006 as a 
watershed year, which could usher in a new era for water quality policy, is 
based on two rather contrasting institutional developments and the end of 
the 2nd stage as Special Measures in the major four rivers finished in 2005. 
 
Firstly, legislation of the Water Act is underway: the MoE and MoCT 
submitted the Bill to the Ministry of Government Legislation (MoLEG) in 
2006. The Water Bill is at the stage of ‘Public notice concerning legisla-
tion’ after the public consultation process. It is soon to be handed over to 
the Parliament for actual enactment. The realisation of long-expected inte-
grated water resource management is historical because of the Water Bill 
itself, as well as the close co-ordination between two rival agencies. As the 
legislation process hasn’t been completed, it is not yet possible to declare 
the better co-ordination an evolving aspect of Korean water governance. If 
the Water Act and its legislation process will proceed as planned, central 
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government has to show a clear but integrated plan to develop multi-level 
water governance, which is not created and running by different directions 
of fragmented organisations. However, the further study needs to follow 
up this on-going evolution of water institutions. 
 
Secondly, MoE set up the new long-term plan on water quality, the Wa-
ter Environment Management Plan (2006~15). The plan differentiates it-
self from the previous water quality management plans by including eco-
logical improvement as a goal of the plan and stressing non-point source 
control, in order to deal with chronic ambient water quality problems in the 
rivers and the lakes. In addition, the plan includes water demand manage-
ment, so the Watershed Policy division created in 2003, led the focus of 
water quality policy in MoE from drinking water and water source by 
2005, to the literally comprehensive plan of wise consumption and the 
conservation of interconnected water systems from nature to end users. In 
a positive sense, it appears that the plan and the active involvement of wa-
tershed division within MoE have finally realised the MoE’s own claims of 
integrated river basin management since 1995. However, the direction to-
ward integrated management within the boundary of MoE is to be limited. 
In particular, the long-term plan of water quality goals without a clear vi-
sion of collaborative management with community and local participants, 
arguably, puts MoE backwards from the information sharing level of pub-
lic participation during the 2nd stage.  
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Fig. 3. Water quality policy & Governance style change in South Korea 
Figure 3 summarises the dynamics and continuity of water quality pol-
icy in South Korea. The first generation of water quality policy, i.e. com-
mand and control, strong regulation of water treatment and land use co-
exists with the second institutional design based on the four large river ba-
sins. The focus of water quality policy for drinking water provision re-
mains the strongest rationale for MoE, however, the third generation of 
policy in MoE and the Water Act legislation shows a more comprehensive 
improvement in water governance in South Korea. In the meantime, col-
laborative governance has started to gain its niche outside the boundary of 
the MoE’s operations: temporary participatory planning of National Water 
Resource Plan Update (2004~5); voluntary emergence of sub-basin water 
partnerships between local governments and NGOs. As the OECD (2006) 
recommends more active reform in governance structures by adopting 
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IWRM principles, and now the strong inertia of state-controlled water 
management in South Korea that has survived for the last two decades will 
have to answer the international pressure as well as the bottom-up experi-
ence of co-managements in the future.  
4. Conclusion 
In the beginning, we argue that the process of policy change is the inter-
related movement among policy reform ideas and policy entrepreneurs’ 
involvement within institutional settings. The stage-based institutional 
analysis explains the South Korean water policy process as a set of incre-
mental change stages. It divides Korean water policy evolution into three 
periods of institutional change and continuation: command-and-control 
regulation under the water quality control measures, participatory and 
place-based management in four major river basins and, finally, integrated 
ecological water management. Despite its explanatory power, the rational 
institutionalism is less capable of addressing the rationale for policy 
change and its bounded rationality. In this sense, the evolution of norma-
tive reform ideas, in particular, in governance style, is adopted to re-
examine the incremental water policy change.  
 
Based on the lenses of shift in governance style from segmented man-
agement to collaborative governance, the national government and its cen-
tral agencies are believed to be the major players in enabling and accom-
modating continuous reforms thus far, which includes the new approach of 
collaborative governance. According to the case analysis in this paper, Ko-
rean water quality policy at the national level has been expanded and 
evolved from sanitation treatment and supply-oriented development by 
fragmented national agencies to ecological river management planning. 
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Not only problem malignancy but also calls for governance reform have 
acted to push the centralised regulation focused policy into more participa-
tory governance. MoE is the main policy entrepreneur in water quality 
management. Though MoE has played a major role to shift the traditional 
way of top-down and elite decision making to a more ‘plural model of 
public policy making’ (McLaughlin and Osborne 2000: 325), water policy 
reform led by MoE has been a rather an eclectic combination of contested 
new and old policy instruments, which have failed to tackle the fundamen-
tal problems. Therefore, we found that problematic water governance 
structure has been survived through three stages of policy reform process.  
 
In conclusion, this study shows strong national government initiatives 
on water quality face the intrinsic problems of a centrally driven process of 
water reform in South Korea. Adopting new policy tools and ideas without 
building up formal and informal institutions of collaborative governance 
has led to the limited and selective operation of innovation for better water 
management. Additionally, the recent popularity of hybrid governance or-
ganisations such as water partnerships at a local level can even weaken the 
pre-existing drawbacks of centrally driven water reform.  
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- Abbreviations 
 
MoE the Ministry of Environment 
MoCT the Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
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MoAF the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
MoCIE the Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy 
MoGAHA the Ministry of Government Administration & Home Affairs   
CMWM the the Comprehensive Measure for Water Management 
 PCSD the Presidential Committee for Sustainable Development  
 BOD  Biological Oxygen Demand  
PMO  the Prime Minister’s Office 
WPCC the Water Policy Coordination Committee 
 WQPA Water Quality Preservation Act 
 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 NGO  Non Governmental Organisation 
  
  
 
